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Resumo
O Declínio do Soft Power do Japão e o Triângulo 
Estratégico EUA-China- Japão.
O artigo analisa a posição do Japão no contexto 
de segurança da Ásia Oriental, tendo em conta 
as mudanças no equilíbrio de poder na região e a 
crescente assimetria entre uma China poderosa e 
“musculada” e um Japão mais vulnerável que se 
debate com uma economia estagnada, uma popu‑
lação em rápido envelhecimento e uma imagem 
ambígua e problemática na região. A disputa te‑
rritorial sobre as ilhas Senkaku/Diaoyu é uma 
manifestação da reorganização do poder na ordem 
regional na medida em que acentua a vulnerabi‑
lidade do Japão e foi usada pela China como um 
mecanismo para enfraquecer a aliança EUA‑Japão 
e opor‑se ao plano de expansão do soft power ame‑
ricano na região através do processo do TPP. Estas 
mudanças desencadearam uma alteração funda‑
mental na estratégia de segurança do Japão no sen‑
tido da sua remilitarização e reconstrução do hard 
power, por forma a compensar o declínio no seu soft 
power, atualmente em fase de implementação pelo 
Governo de inspiração nacionalista liderado por 
Shinzo Abe.
Abstract
The paper analyses Japan’s position in the East 
Asia security context, taking into account the un‑
derlying changes in power balance in East Asia 
and an increasing asymmetry between a powerful 
and muscled China and a more vulnerable Japan, 
struggling with a stagnant economy, a rapidly 
ageing population and an ambiguous image in 
East Asia. The Senkaku/Diaoyu islands territorial 
dispute is a manifestation of the ongoing reorga‑
nization of power in the regional order insofar it 
accentuates Japan’s vulnerability and was used 
by China as an opportunity to undermine the US‑
Japan alliance and at the same time to oppose the 
new US soft power move associated with the TPP. 
This seems to have triggered a fundamental chan‑
ge in Japan’s security strategy in the direction of 
militarization and rebuilding its hard power, in 
order to compensate for its declining soft power, 
now under implementation by the new right‑wing 
nationalist government led by Shinzo Abe.
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East Asia is one of the powerhouses of the world economy but simultaneously one 
of the most critical areas for global security given the considerable level of tension 
and friction between major regional powers, frequently associated with territorial 
disputes that are increasingly linked with the problems of energy insecurity, the 
acceleration of the arms race and the existence of important “hot spots”. The deficit 
of regional multilateralism and the inexistence of institutions of collective security 
further aggravate the risks of serious inter‑state conflict. So far, the United States 
(US) as the dominant power in the region has not only prevented the escalation of 
tensions but has also opposed any idea of East Asia regionalism thus addressing 
the symptoms but not the causes of the problem. 
Japan is an Asian power that is presently facing a considerable number of chal‑
lenges ranging from poor economic performance to a rapidly ageing population, 
political instability and strategic deficit. The recent territorial disputes in which 
Japan has been involved, in particular the one over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, 
have contributed to expose Japan’s vulnerabilities and increase the urgency of 
a strategic articulated response regarding the bilateral relations with China, the 
relations with the US and with other Asian countries, in particular South Korea, 
putting pressure on Japanese decision makers.  
The paper is structured in three parts. The first section looks at the multidimen‑
sional vulnerabilities of Japan and the reasons why change seems to be blocked. 
The second section analyses the new developments in the security policy of Japan 
introduced by the new Abe Government and the implications for China‑Japan re‑
lations. The third section looks in more detail into the Senkaku islands conflict 
between China and Japan, seen as a good case to understand not only the current 
state of relations between Tokyo and Beijing but also the underlying strategic dy‑
namics and the rebalancing of the US‑Japan‑China triangle.
Japan Increasing Vulnerabilities
From an economic perspective the Japanese economy has suffered from long term 
stagnation in the last decade with a persistent low growth between 2005‑2007 and 
negative growth since 2008 until 2011, with the exception of 2010 (table 1).
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Table 1 – Japan Economic Growth, 2005‑2012
Source: Japan Statistical Bureau for 2005‑2010 (www.stat.go.jp.data/nenkan/pdf/203‑6); IMF 
World Economic Outlook 23.1.2013 (table 1); UN DESA Global Economic Situation January 2013.
It entered recently in recession mainly because of the combined effect of a decline 
in exports and a persistently weak domestic demand.  Real growth was slightly 
better because Japan has had a long period of deflation, a decline in prices that 
reached ‑1.4% in 2009 and ‑0.7% in 2010. This combination of stagnation and de‑
flation has had a negative impact on investment which has been declining for the 
last 5 years. With two of the potential engines of growth, private consumption and 
investment, in paralysis for a long time, all prospects of growth became dependent 
on the evolution of the third engine, exports and external demand, which started 
to face problems from 2007 onwards. 
However, despite economic stagnation, there are some positive aspects in Ja‑
pan’s economic performance. The first one is a low and declining rate of un‑
employment, one of the best in the OECD context, with a 4,5% unemployment 
rate in 2012, decli‑ning from 5.1% in 2009 (OECD, 2012). This clearly contrasts 
with other developed economies, namely the US and the EU afflicted with in‑
creasing unemployment after 2008. There is certainly a contradiction between a 
stagnant economy and a falling and low unemployment rate, one would expect 
the opposite. However, this appa‑rent paradox is to a great extent explained by 
demographics and the ageing population so that there is not a teen employment 
pressure, as well as by the employment policy of Japanese conglomerates and the 
decline in real wages in Japan.
The other positive aspect is related to equity. In spite of stagnation and difficulties 
there has not been an increase in social asymmetries and inequality. Japan has been 
able to preserve a reasonably even distribution of income with a Gini coe‑fficient 
of 0.329 in the late 2000s, slightly lower than in 2000 with 0.34, in terms of dispos‑
able income after tax. However, in the OECD context Japan is a relatively unequal 
country, an above average country integrated in a group of 15 countries that are 
above the OECD‑34 average of 0.316 (OECD, 2011). 
Year	   Growth	  rate	  %	  (nominal)	   Growth	  rate	  %	  	  (real)	  
2005	   0	   1.3	  
2006	   0.6	   1.7	  
2007	   1.2	   2.2	  
2008	   -­‐2.3	   -­‐1.1	  
2009	   -­‐6.0	   -­‐5.5	  
2010	   2.3	   4.4	  
2011	   -­‐1.0	   -­‐0.7	  
2012	   1.6	   1.6	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The Japanese economy became highly interconnected and interdependent with the 
Chinese economy both in terms of trade and investment. China is Japan´s largest 
trading partner since 2007 absorbing 20% of Japanese exports and accounting for 
22% of Japanese imports (Statistics Bureau of Japan, 2012). Bilateral trade relations 
are increasingly unbalanced as the trade deficit of Japan has been widening to 
reach US$ 42 billion in 2012. As far as investment is concerned China is the first 
destination of Japanese FDI and the accumulated stock reached in 2012 a total of 
US$ 84 billion. In contrast China is Japan’s biggest national debt holder with a total 
of US$ 230 billion. 
This high level of interdependence has relevant strategic and security impli‑
cations insofar the positive expectations of closer economic relations bringing 
about better political relations and stable co‑operation between Tokyo and Bei‑
jing have not materialize. On the contrary, a less positive scenario marked by 
the use of economic soft power to retaliate and exert coercion and an increasing 
perception of vulnerability on the part of Japan seem to prevail.
An important sign of Japan’s declining economic power is the deterioration of its 
trade balance. In fact, one of the world top exporters that hold consistently large 
trade surpluses for decades, presented a considerable trade deficit in 2012 in the 
amount of US$ 78 billion, the first ever since 1980 if we discard a small deficit in 2011, 
which might just indicate the beginning of a new trend. This deficit is explained by 
the interaction of different factors that led to a decrease in exports and an increase in 
imports. On the export side, the decline can be explained by three main reasons: the 
impact of a strong yen that revalued 8% against the euro and 4.5% against the dollar 
in the course of 2012; the impact of the slowdown in the EU and the US demand; the 
impact of the boycott of Japanese goods by China after the aggravation of the territo‑
rial dispute over the Senkaku islands in September. On the import side, the increase 
in the imports of energy caused by the shutting down of the majority of nuclear re‑
actors following the Fukushima disaster was a key factor. 
So, behind the 2012 trade deficit we find not only cyclical factors but also two 
structural factors that have long term implications:  rising Japan’s energy insecu‑
rity and an increasing dependency on energy imports as a result of the nuclear 
energy question; the effects of a growing interdependence with China and the 
risks of deteriorating political relations in a context where Beijing is increasingly 
willing to use its economic muscle and retaliate against countries that take deci‑
sions seen as contrary to China’s interests, as previously seen in the case of the 
Philippines in the context of the territorial disputes in the South China Sea1.  Fur‑
1  The tension between Manila and Beijing over the Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea, 
which began on 8 April 2012 when the Philippines sent its Navy to intercept Chinese vessels 
fishing in the area, led China to impose restrictions on the imports of bananas and other fruits, 
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thermore, the deficit is not simply an economic problem but has political implica‑
tions insofar it triggers a change in the international image of Japan and adds to 
a perception of vulnerability and fragility.
Furthermore, Japan is confronted with a rapidly ageing population, the fastest 
in the world, as a result of the combination between two key variables: very low 
birth rates and very high life expectancy. In fact, Japan has the lowest birth rates 
in the world, with 7.31 births p.a. per 1000 people, and simultaneously the high‑
est average life expectancy in the world, with 83 years. With 23% of the popula‑
tion older than 65 years in 2010, up from 20% in 2005, Japan also possesses the 
highest old‑age dependency ratio in the world (ratio of the population aged over 
65 years to the working population) with 38% (Kashiwase et al., 2012: 5) 2. 
The pace of the ageing process is an additional factor of vulnerability and poses 
enormous challenges for Japan insofar it has three fundamental implications. 
Firstly, it puts pressure on public expenditure, in terms of health expenses and 
pensions, making it particularly difficult for Japan to correct its large budget 
deficit which reached already 10% of GDP. Secondly, the ageing process – insofar 
older population is particularly concerned with the uncertainty of health care 
and the pension system and tend to save more – is a key factor behind the sta‑
gnant domestic consumption that in turn prevents growth recovery. Thirdly, it 
raises fundamental questions about Japan’s immigration policy which has been 
traditionally very restrictive making Japan one of the countries with the smallest 
foreign community, accounting only for 1.6% of the total population3, and the 
need to open up to inflows of young and qualified immigrants.
Governance problems are also part of the equation. In the last decade Japan tried 
twice to rethink its growth and development model in the face of poor economic 
performance and the need to address the challenges of an ageing society. The first 
structured attempt was launched in October 2006 by the Abe Government, the 
“Innovation 25” Strategy, aimed at promoting the transition towards a knowledge 
society/economy and marked by two innovative perspectives: first, the adoption 
of a systemic view of competitiveness, no longer associated with individual firms 
or units; second, broadening the concept of innovation which was no longer re‑
or to delay customs procedures that caused the loss of the products. These were real trade 
sanctions outside WTO rules that severely hurt the Philippines as China accounts for more 
than 30% of its banana exports.  See Yale Global Online, Yale Center for the Study of Globaliza‑
tion, China‑Southeast Asia Relations; on China’s two path relations with ASEAN see Robert 
Sutter and Chin‑hao Huang (2012).
2  See also Statistics Bureau of Japan (2011). 2010 Japan Census.
3  According to the data from Japan 2010 Census, there were a total of 2.134.151 foreigners resi‑
ding in Japan, a country with a total population of around 128 million, the large majority more 
than ¾ (1,6 million) from Asia, especially  Chinese (32%) and Koreans  (26.4%).
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stricted to “technological innovation” but extended also to social innovation. As a 
result of the fall of the Abe government and the impact of the 2008 financial crisis 
which required short term focus, the long term strategy was forgotten and never 
implemented. 
The second attempt was made in 2010 by the Democratic Party government trying 
to break the impasse of the Japanese economy and the persistent economic stagna‑
tion through the definition and implementation of a new approach named “The 
New Growth Strategy” approved by the Cabinet in June 20104. The main purpose 
was to formulate a long term strategic plan, up to 2020, to revitalize the Japanese 
economy through a new demand‑side growth approach seen as an alternative to 
the previous two failed strategies adopted by the LDP: the public works strategy 
that prevailed in the 60s and 70s and the productivity‑oriented supply‑side strat‑
egy of the 80s and 90s. 
The strategy attached priority to three main objectives, a strong economy, robust 
public finances and strong social security. In terms of operational objectives it 
represents a departure from standard practice insofar it identifies four new areas 
of growth that should be able to fuel the process and achieve the proposed target 
to raise the annual average real growth rate from less than 1% in the previous 
decade to 2% in the following decade until 2020. These strategic areas of growth 
included: (1) “green innovation” the new role green technologies can play in 
meeting sustainable objectives in particular in the area of reduction of green‑
house gases and creating jobs; (2)“life innovation” that could turn Japan in a 
healthcare superpower and enhance its capacity to deal with the ageing popula‑
tion problem, providing high quality services; (3) “Asian economy” in the sense 
that Japan can take the opportunities presented by the fast growing economies in 
Asia in terms of meeting their demands for infrastructure , services and technol‑
ogy; (4)“tourism and the regions”, as tourism should become one of the engines 
of growth, turning Japan into a tourism‑oriented nation able to reach the target 
of 30 million tourists per year. 
To a certain extent the “New Growth Strategy” recovers some of the ideas con‑
tained in the “Innovation 25 Strategy”, in particular the dimensions of the green 
innovation and life innovation as well as the necessity of a more open Japan, wi‑
lling to receive highly skilled immigrants which partly depend on the implementa‑
tion of the university students exchange programme. So far it is restricted to Asia, 
particularly China and South Korea, aimed at sending 300.000 Japanese students 
overseas and to receive 300.000 foreign students in Japan until 2020. 
4  On the contents of the New Growth Strategy see Cabinet decision 18.6.2010; on implementa‑
tion assessment in 2011 see Cabinet decision 25.1.2011.
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Yet, once again political instability and the impact of the “Great East Japan Earth‑
quake” (with its triple dimension an earthquake, a tsunami and a nuclear accident) 
refocused the agenda with an emphasis on infrastructure reconstruction, prevent‑
ing the implementation of the New Growth Strategy.  It is true that in both cases 
the impact of large scale unforeseen factors played a role, but above all it highlights 
the extent to which a dysfunctional political system dominated by power politics 
and the associated level of political instability and rapid succession of govern‑
ments since 2006 – seven governments in six years5, an average duration of less 
than one year – has prevented a systematic and persistent implementation of struc‑
tural reforms indispensable to solve Japan’s economic problems.
Political Instability and Governance
One of the fundamental factors that limit Japan’s ability to sustain the declining 
trend in economic, political and strategic influence and respond to new challenges 
has been the rigidness of Japan’s political system and its lack of renovation. The 
system has been dominated since 1955, for nearly 60 years, by a single party the 
Liberal Democratic Party, which was uninterruptedly in power until 2009 (with a 
small exception between 1993‑1994). 
Although a democracy, the system has some specific features that differentiates Ja‑
pan from other mature democracies. Firstly, the dominance of a single party and 
the absence of alternation in power which means that new ideas and policies are di‑
fficult to flourish. Secondly, the elected Prime‑Minister and political leadership have 
limited power as real power rests with the “Iron triangle”, the alliance between poli‑
ticians, bureaucrats and big business and therefore a high interdependence between 
economic and political power and considerable levels of corruption. Thirdly, a high 
level of political turbulence. Above all it is a system where there is no competition 
but rather a monopoly of a single party, with a high resistance to change. 
No doubt the system has evolved, however the most significant changes that have 
taken place over the last 20 years, such as the 1994 reform of the electoral sys‑
tem which replaced a multi‑seat constituency system by a single‑member cons‑
tituency, or the increasing role of civil society in Japan politics following the 1998 
law that allowed the creation of thousands of associations and lobby groups, were 
insufficient to bring about any real structural change.
As a result of the unprecedented victory of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) 
in 2009 with an absolute majority (308 seats out of 480 in the Lower House), there 
were high expectations on a structural change in the political system. The DPJ 
5  Since 2006 Japan had seven different governments: Shinzo Abe (2006‑2007), Fukuda (2007‑
2008), Taro Aso (2008‑2009), Yukio Hatoyama (2009‑2010), Naoto Kan (2010‑2011), Yoshihiko 
Noda (2011‑2012) and Shinzo Abe (2012‑… ).
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was elected on the basis of far reaching proposals to eliminate corruption, assert 
leadership over the bureaucracy, overcome stagnation by stimulating economic 
growth through changes in the development model, to build a more sustainable 
welfare system and, on the external front, to reduce the dependence on the US and 
strengthen ties with East Asia through new forms of regional cooperation. In short, 
the new government wanted to change the system put in place by the LDP which 
proved no longer able to deliver economic prosperity nor security and strategic 
relevance to Japan. 
However, the high political instability caused by the succession of three Prime‑
Ministers in just three years under the Democratic Party, first Hatoyama who 
was forced to step down because of corruption scandals, followed by Naoto Kan 
(2010) who had to manage the difficult process of the earthquake and the Fuku‑
shima problem, and finally Yoshihiko Noda (2011), meant that the new power 
lost control of the agenda and the vast majority of promises of change remained 
unfulfilled. 
The frustration with the lack of reforms and the return to economic stagnation and 
even recession, after the short interruption in 2010 when the economy grew at a 
rate of 4%, were major ingredients to understand the return to power of the LDP, 
led once again by Shinzo Abe, that won the election held on 16 December 2012 with 
an absolute majority of 298 seats out of 480. The LDP decided to form a coalition 
government with the New Komeito Party as together they will secure a 2/3 ma‑
jority in the Lower House of Parliament, thus enabling the new majority to over‑
ride a veto by the Upper House, where the Democratic Party has still a majority, 
thus overcoming the problems of a “twisted Diet”. This rapid return to the LDP 
means that Japan is back to business as usual and consequently that the renovation 
of the political system has failed and does not look likely in the near future. The 
paralysis of Japan’s political system is part and parcel of Japan’s problems.
The new cabinet headed by Shinzo Abe is dominated by conservatives as the 
Prime‑Minister, just like the two former LDP prime‑ministers Koizumi and Fuku‑
da, belongs to the most conservative faction (Seiwa Seisaku Kenkyukai) supported 
by big business (keiretsu) and traditional elite families, of the three main factions 
within the LDP6.  It has been regarded as a highly nationalistic cabinet (The Econo‑
mist, 2013), where the great majority of cabinet members support visits to the con‑
troversial Yasukuni shrine and a firm stand vis‑à‑vis neighbours as far as territorial 
disputes are concerned. Although it is uncertain whether the new government will 
6  The Liberal Democratic Party has been traditionally divided in three main factions the liberal 
wing (Heisi Kenkyukai) supported by farmers, blue‑collar workers, construction industry; the 
liberal keynesian faction supported by the bureaucracy, white‑collar workers, traders; and the 
nationalist faction (Seiwa Seisaku Kenkyukai) supported by the big business and conglomerates. 
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be able to implements its political strategy, it is certain that a more nationalistic 
and radical stand of Japan is a risky strategy likely to further worsen relations 
with China and indeed to fuel tensions with, and raise concerns in other Asian 
countries. 
In short, it can be argued that the dysfunctional nature of the political system 
emerges clearly as one of the fundamental factors behind Japan’s relative decline 
and constitutes a bottleneck to Japan’s revitalization. Moreover, the lack of com‑
petition both in politics, dominated by a single party, and in the economy, domi‑
nated by big conglomerates, is, as rightly noted by some authors (Emmott, 2009), 
a structural problem that afflicts Japan. The paradox is that this non‑competition 
system is increasingly exposed not only to global competition but above all to an 
enormous competition pressure by China.
Security Policy
The security environment in East Asia is clearly more challenging and less favora‑
ble today to Japan than ever before. This is clearly recognized in Japan Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs’, Japan Diplomatic Bluebook (2012: 30) which states that “The secu‑
rity environment surrounding Japan is becoming increasingly severe year to year”. 
Japan has identified since 2004 two main threats to its security, two neighbour 
countries, North Korea and China. North Korea is seen as a major threat taking 
into account its nuclear programme and policy of development and proli‑feration 
of weapons of mass destruction as well as its military actions and provocations on 
the Korean Peninsula. 
As far as China is concerned the main argument has consistently been the lack 
of transparency of Beijing’s policy of increasing defense expenditure and mo‑ 
dernization of military forces strengthening its power projection capabilities. An 
additional point has been added more recently related to the expansion of China’s 
maritime activities in the surrounding waters of Japan, as a result of various inci‑
dents since the 2004 incident with the Chinese nuclear‑powered submarine that 
entered Japanese waters (near southernmost islands), seen as an attempt to test 
Japanese and American detection technology, followed by various incidents with 
Chinese exploration vessels and fishing boats.
In the new security strategy incorporated in the 2010 National Defense Program 
Guidelines (NDPG) for the period 2011‑2015, approved by the Cabinet in Decem‑
ber 2010, a third threat was identified, Russia, as a consequence of its renewed mili‑
tary build up and the increasing activity in the Far East, and fuelled by renewed 
tensions around the dispute over the Northern territories/Kurile islands as a result 
of president Medvedev’s 2010 visit to the islands.  
It is interesting to note that Japan had already anticipated in the 2010 document 
an increase of what was called the “gray zone disputes”, confrontations over 
Livro134.indd   67 13/05/15   14:20
Nação e Defesa 68
Miguel Santos Neves
te‑rritory, sovereignty and economic interests which are unlikely to escalate 
into war. 
The NDPG adopts a new concept of “Dynamic Defense Forces”, which re‑present 
a subtle departure from the traditional concept of a basic defense force. This im‑
plies greater proactivity, greater mobility, sustainability, flexibility and versatil‑
ity, but within the constitutional limits. It does not go as far as to support the 
expansion of the forces, or relevant changes in their mission, or any increase 
of the defense budget. At the same time it made clear that effective deterrence 
was a key area and that priority would be attached, among others, to respond 
effectively to attacks on offshore islands and to cyber attacks, clearly with China in 
mind. In the 2012 Japan Defense White Paper (Japan Ministry of Defence, 2012) this 
concept was further developed in more specific terms and associated with the fle‑
xible deployment of the SDF to Japan’s southwest island chain, including Okinawa 
and the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, clearly to address China’s maritime challenge.
 There is an increasing concern of Japan with maritime security and freedom of 
navigation not only in the Southeast Asia region sea lanes and the threats in the 
Malacca Straits, but increasingly in waters closer to Japan. This results from the 
combination of two factors. Firstly, a renewed awareness and concern7, brought 
about by recent natural disasters, of Japan’s vulnerability which derives both from 
the possession of vast territorial waters hard to control and ensure surveillance, 
and the fact Japan is a global trader, highly dependent on imports of fundamen‑
tal goods, such as food and oil, and exports to foreign markets which are mostly 
transported by sea. Moreover, Japan has key infrastructures located in coastal 
areas. Secondly, China’s priority to develop its maritime power and to acquire a 
blue water navy, expanding its range of action and increasing assertiveness in the 
East China Sea, just like in the South China Sea, raises security concerns in Tokyo 
as well as in other parts of Asia. 
In short, maritime security is a fundamental condition for both Japan’s security 
and prosperity but the sea became the realm of competition between the two rival 
powers in Asia for complex reasons: (1) energy insecurity as the two powers are 
highly dependent on foreign supply, and rich reserves of oil and gas exist in the 
East China Sea; (2) risks of food insecurity making the access to alternative food 
supply in the future, especially fishing resources, critical ‑ the region is rich in such 
resources thus generating a competition to ensure fishing rights; (3) nationalism, 
prestige and rivalry for leadership in Asia. 
As a reaction to recent developments, the new Abe government intends to go fur‑
ther and to take a more radical stand. It has already announced last December it 
7  See National Defense Program Guidelines for FY 2011 and Beyond.
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will undertake a revision of the 2010 NDPG. This revision is aimed at expanding 
the size and activities of the Self‑Defense Forces and its equipment, creating new 
military bases, like the new base in the Ishigaki‑Jima island, and consequently 
at increasing the defense budget. Furthermore, Prime Minister Abe wants to re‑
vive the 2006 project to amend the Japanese constitution, with a view to amend 
article 9 which enshrines the “pacifist clause”. According to the interpretation 
consolidated since 19548, the clause allows for Japan’s right of self‑defense and 
the possibility of having self‑defense forces, but prohibits the existence of normal 
and full armed forces, the possession and use of offensive weapons as well as 
the participation of Japanese forces in any external mission not directly related 
with the defense of Japan nor in collective security operations. The constitutional 
framework not only sharply contrasts with the current military capacity of Ja‑
pan, which possesses the most sophisticated navy in Asia and has a high level 
of military expenditure, the sixth largest in the world9, but prevents Japan from 
assuming greater responsibilities in international security and participating in 
operations of collective security. 
If implemented this represents a significant change in Japan’s policy and the pref‑
erence for a more militaristic strategy rather than a diplomatic one to respond to 
the new security challenges posed by China, North Korea and other players. It is 
uncertain whether Abe will be able to implement all his plans considering he faces 
two important obstacles. First the opposition of the leader of the New Komeito 
Party, the other member of the coalition, Natsuo Yamaguchi, who clearly does not 
support the revision of the Constitution (Japan Times, 2012) and has also expressed 
different views on how to deal with China over the Senkaku dispute. Second, the 
public finance serious constraints to accommodate a considerable increase in pu‑ 
blic expenditure in defense. 
8  The interpretation of article 9 of the Cabinet Legislation Bureau (CLB) allowed for the crea‑
tion of the Self Defense Forces without any amendment of the Constitution and paved the 
way for the approval of the SDF Establishment Law. The argument was that Japan as a sover‑
eign state had the right to self‑defense under certain conditions which were specified: it could 
only respond with “minimum necessary force”; could not participate in any collective security 
arrangements; can not send forces abroad. On Constitutional revision see Samuels (2004).
9  According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Yearbook 2012, in 
2011 Japan was the 6th largest military spender with US$59.3 billion while China was the 2nd 
largest spender with US $143 billion, more than the double of Japan’s expenditure. 2006 was 
the year when China for the first time surpassed Japan in terms of military expenditure: Ja‑
pan’s total military expenses reached then US$ 43.7 billion, the 5th largest military expenditure 
in the world accounting for 4% of global military expenditure, while China maintained the 
trend of rising military expenditure reaching a total value of US$ 49.5 billion.
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The Senkaku Dispute and China-Japan-US Relations
One of the main causes of change has been the aggravation of the dispute with 
China over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands which offers also an excellent opportu‑
nity to explore the recent changes in East Asia strategic setting. 
The dispute over the Senkaku islands, which have been administered by Japan 
since 1895 but claimed by China, increased the level of tension already in 2010 
when a collision between a Chinese fishing boat and a Japanese Coast Guard 
vessel occurred. Reacting to this incident, the US in a statement by the Secre‑
tary of State Hillary Clinton (2010) in Hanoi, declared that the Senkaku islands 
were within the scope of application of the US‑Japan Security Treaty stating “... 
with respect to the Senkaku Islands, the United States has never taken a position on 
sovereignty, but we have made it very clear that the islands are part of our mutual trea-
ty obligations, and the obligation to defend Japan”. There was nothing new in the 
statement, it merely confirmed the US traditional position with two components: 
the US adopts a neutral position with regard to the substance of the problem 
and the sovereignty issue; however, article II of the US‑Japan Security Treaty is 
applicable to the Senkaku islands because they were included in the 1971 
Okinawa Reversion Treaty (Manyin, 2012). This was a clear sign that led China 
to refrain its actions in the region thus diffusing tension at the time, also because 
the US pressed for a negotiated solution and made itself available to host trilat‑
eral talks on the issue.
In 2012 again the tensions increased after the April declaration of Governor Shin‑
taro Ishihara, a nationalist, saying he intended to lead a movement to purchase 
three of the eight islands from their private owner and advocating that Japan 
should demonstrate control by building infrastructures there (telecommunica‑
tions, a port, a meteorological station). He started implementing the plan by rais‑
ing money from the public through the internet. This caused large protests in 
China and in September the Japanese Government purchased the three islands 
justifying the decision to prevent the group of nationalists to get hold of the is‑
lands. The tension increased even further and violent anti‑Japanese riots erupted 
in China in more than 50 cities (Asahi Shimbun, 2012) at the same time the ac‑
tivities by fishermen, patrol vessels and activists from the Japanese and Chinese 
sides increased around the islands. 
China considered the acquisition of the islands by the Japanese government 
as a change in the status quo and therefore adopted a hardline position imple‑
menting various retaliation measures with significant impact on bilateral rela‑
tions. Firstly, Beijing requested the cancellation of all the celebrations planned 
for the 40th anniversary of the normalization of Japan‑China relations back in 
1972. Secondly, it promoted a systematic entrance of Chinese ships in Japan te‑ 
rritorial waters around the islands culminating on 13 December with the en‑
Livro134.indd   70 13/05/15   14:20
Nação e Defesa71
Japan’s Declining Soft Power and the US‑China‑Japan Relations
trance of a China State Oceanic Administration airplane in Japan’s airspace over 
the Senkaku. 
Thirdly, economic retaliation involving the boycott to Japanese goods and tour‑
ism leading to a considerable decline in trade and investment flows. China im‑
ports from Japan are believed to have declined 14% in September alone and even 
more in October. Japanese firms producing in China were also hit not only in 
terms of destruction of factories during the riots (Panasonic factory in Qingdao 
and Mitsumi Electric factory in Shandong are examples) but also in terms of de‑
cline in sales. The car sector was one of the most affected leading suddenly to a 
sharp decline in Japan’s share of China car market from 23% in January‑August 
to 14% in September‑October10. 
It should be stressed that the territorial disputes between China and Japan in the 
East China Sea are not limited to the Senkaku islands but include also two other 
issues. Firstly, a dispute over the maritime boundary in the East China Sea where 
China claims the all continental shelf of the Okinawa Trough and Japan claims 
the same shelf to a median line between the Chinese and Japanese territories. 
There has been some progress in this issue as the two parties signed in 2008 an 
agreement for joint exploration of gas and oil in some fields in the area around 
the median line, but in reality there was no real progress as the agreement has 
not been implemented. Secondly, the issue of Okinotorishima islet and to what 
extent it is entitled to have an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), as Japan claims, 
or has no grounds for that, as China argues, because it is a simple rock which can 
not support human life.
It is true that competition for the control of resources, oil and natural gas but 
also marine fish resources and the attempt to secure fishing rights, is a key fac‑
tor to understand the conflict over the Senkaku. However, the conflict goes well 
beyond that and has a fundamental strategic dimension, which also explains 
Beijing’s strong reaction, insofar it touches simultaneously on the two most sen‑
sitive security issues for China: the Taiwan question and the US‑Japan alliance 
strategic scope. 
It is useful to recall that the Chinese claimed rights over the Senkaku/Diaoyu 
are supported by the proximity to Taiwan and its alleged integration in Tai‑
wan’s territorial waters which Beijing considers part of China’s sovereign ter‑
10  For a detailed analysis of the various impacts on bilateral relations and a first assessment of the 
decline in trade and investment see Przystup (2013). In the car sector Honda reported a decline 
of 40.5%, in sales in September compared to September 2011, Toyota a decline of 48.9% and 
Nissan 35.3% in the same period. Pharmaceutical companies also reported a abnormal levels of 
products returned from Chinese hospitals. In the same spirit Chinese construction companies 
boycotted the use of Japanese elevators.
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ritory. So the Senkaku are directly interconnected with Taiwan and the fact that 
it is Beijing, not the Taiwanese government that remained relatively invisible 
throughout the crisis, which confronts Japan is indirectly a demonstration of 
Beijing’s exercise of sovereignty over Taiwan. In addition, Beijing has been al‑
ways very concerned about the interference of Japan in Taiwan, the existence 
of close ties between Japanese nationalists and Taiwanese sectors pushing for 
independence, and so considers that the April 2012 initiative carried out by 
nationalists had to be firmly dealt with in order to prevent any risk of further 
destabilization of Taiwan.
Secondly, the Senkaku dispute calls directly into question the issue of the strate‑
gic scope of the US‑Japan alliance as the 2010 Clinton statement clearly indicates. 
For Beijing this is regarded as a hostile alliance to contain China and to counter 
China’s increasing power in Asia. I would argue that one of the structural causes 
of Japan‑China political tension since the late 90s has been the strengthening of the 
US‑Japan security alliance and the adoption of the 1997 Guidelines for US‑Japan 
Defence Cooperation that replaced the 1978 Guidelines. Beijing perceived the in‑
clusion of the new dimension of “cooperation in situations in areas surrounding Japan” 
as an expansion of the scope of the alliance, with clear implications for Taiwan 
and therefore as being directed against China and aimed at containing it. In this 
light the increase in China‑Japan tension is for Beijing a way to test the consistency 
of the US‑Japan alliance as well as a potential mechanism to undermine the alli‑
ance, explore its contradictions and erode it, certainly one of the key objectives of 
China’s foreign policy.
There is a new “soft power” dimension to this related to the development of the 
Trans‑Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP) founded in 2005 in the context of APEC 
by four countries, Singapore, New Zealand, Brunei and Chile and later on expand‑
ed to include five other major economies from Asia and the Americas, the US, 
Malaysia, Peru, Australia and Vietnam. Both Mexico and Canada are also joining 
the negotiations and the same position might be taken by South Korea and Japan. 
China has not been invited and the requirements could not be met by Beijing at 
the present time. 
From a strategic point of view, the TPP has been seen as a mechanism to strengthen 
the ties between the US and Asian countries and rebuild Washington’s declining 
soft power, eroded by Beijing increasing soft power during the last de‑cade, not 
only as a means to reassure Asian countries about the US commitment to the re‑
gion, but also to offer an alternative to China’s increasing power. In other words, 
the TPP process aims at preventing that Asian countries, in particular South Korea, 
Taiwan and Japan, be absorbed into China’s giant magnet economy and to serve 
as a second leg that complements US hard power in Asia, thus enhancing Wash‑
ington’s smart power, in order to rebalance power in the region and contain China 
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(IISS, 2012). Beijing clearly perceives the TPP as a mechanism to marginalize China 
and to contain it11.
Japanese Prime Minister Noda took a step forward in 2012 when he announced 
that Japan wanted to accelerate talks with the US to overcome obstacles for Ja‑
pan to enter TPP negotiations (Daily Yomiri, 2012). South Korea will also consider 
that possibility in the medium term. For China this means that not only the TPP 
will make Japan less dependent on China’s economy, thus weakening one of the 
most effective instruments for Beijing to press Tokyo, but the TPP becomes a com‑
petitor solution and a threat to China’s preferred basis for regional integration the 
ASEAN+3 framework under China’s dominance.
So Beijing’s strong reaction to the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute is to a great extent 
a reaction to a broader context where structural changes that could reshape the 
balance of power in Asia are taking form. It constituted a clear attempt to condi‑
tion Japan’s possible decision to join the TPP and it can be said it yielded some 
results insofar as in late November it was announced the launch of negotiations 
in early 2013 for a trilateral FTA between China, Japan and South Korea (China 
Daily, 2012).
It should be stressed that Japan’s position vis‑à‑vis China is potentially further 
weakened by the proliferation of Japan’s simultaneous territorial disputes with 
other neighbouring countries, South Korea and Russia. This high level of conflict, 
opening too many fronts at the same time, tends to affect negatively Japan’s image 
in the region and might be seen as an expression of poor strategic thinking in Tokyo.
Regarding the Northern Territories dispute with Russia (Kurile islands for Mos‑
cow), occupied by Russia since 1945 but claimed by Japan, 2010 was a delicate 
year for Tokyo as President Medvedev visited the islands, the first ever Russian/
Soviet leader to do so, in a clear gesture of assertion of sovereignty making clear 
that Russia had no plans to cede the territory. Again in August 2012 Russian naval 
vessels were sent to the waters surrounding the islands allegedly to participate in 
a ceremony to honour WWII soldiers.
As far as the dispute with South Korea over Takeshima islets in the Sea of Japan 
(Dokdo for South Korea), administered by South Korea but claimed by Japan, is 
concerned, 2012 witnessed also a significant development following the unpre‑
cedented visit of ROK President Lee Myung‑bak to the islands also in August. The 
visit triggered a strong reaction on the part of Japan that considered Mr. Lee’s visit 
“unacceptable” and recalled its ambassador from Seoul in protest.
11  See article “TPP may drive Brics into action” in China Daily (6th September, 2012). One of the 
comments was “China’s exclusion is strange given its huge economic presence in Asia‑Pacific. 
This has given rise to views that the US is driving the TPP with the strategic objective of mar‑
ginalizing China”.
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Later on Tokyo decided to invite South Korea to jointly refer the dispute of Take‑
shima islands to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) (Japan Times, 2012)12 in 
a strategy with a double objective. On the one hand to de‑escalate the conflict 
and move to a peaceful solution format insofar a serious dispute with the ROK, 
also a key ally of the US in the region, is unthinkable. On the other hand, in a 
context of interlinked territorial disputes, the initiative was aimed at sending a 
clear message to Beijing in the sense that China should also go to the ICJ in order 
to exercise its claim to the Senkaku islands. As a response to South Korea’s re‑
fusal of the ICJ alternative, Tokyo considered the possibility to take unilaterally 
the territorial dispute to the ICJ in late 2012. However, recently the new Prime‑
Minister Abe decided to suspend it for the time being as a gesture of goodwill 
towards South Korea to pave the way to an improvement in bilateral relations 
(Asahi Shimbun, 2013). 
These territorial disputes have a direct impact on China‑Japan relations in two dif‑
ferent ways. Firstly, the interlinkages between the different disputes reduces Tokyo’s 
room for manoeuvre and flexibility in the sense it has to be extremely coherent in 
all cases and can not show more flexibility in the Senkaku case because of the prec‑
edents and side impact this could have on the other two disputes; by the same token, 
it can not be more flexible in the disputes with South Korea or Russia because it 
could give Beijing arguments or a precedent it could use in the Senkaku case. 
Secondly, China has argued that all these simultaneous disputes prove that Japan is 
artificially fuelling a series of territorial disputes and tension in order to justify and 
find a legitimacy basis, both domestically and internationally, to rearm and follow 
a militaristic and “normalization” path by revising the Constitution and abolishing 
the “pacifist clause” which was Japan’s conservative nationalists’ main objective in 
the first place. Of course that China is speaking to the region and trying to raise fears 
in other Asian countries about a potential remilitarization of Japan, trying to play the 
history card and diverting attention from its own coercion policy in the South China 
Sea. However, if the Abe Government adopts a hardline response, changes the status 
of the Self‑Defense Forces and raises the defense budget, China will gain political 
points and this will have a negative impact in the region.
One of Japan’s fundamental responses to the security vulnerabilities will be 
strengthening the US‑Japan alliance, the cornerstone of Japan’s foreign and secu‑
rity policy. More than ever before, Japan needs the US support and security gua‑
rantees to face the challenges of a rising China which is increasingly resorting to 
coercion, absorbed by its own national interests and unable to exercise leadership. 
12  The proposal was formally presented to the ROK on 21 August 2012. See the press release 
of the Japanese embassy in the Netherlands. “Japan’s position on Takeshima”. Available at 
http://www.nl.emb‑japan.go.jp/e/policy/response%20takeshima.html.
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The relation with the US has experienced some difficulties during the DPJ period, 
as a result of the Okinawa dossier but also of the strategy implemented since the 
mid 2000s that the “normalization” of Japan would benefit from greater autonomy 
in relation to the US and diversification of relations. Presently, a more fragile Ja‑
pan is probably convinced that the search for greater autonomy from the US is a 
risky strategy insofar it can jeopardize the alliance and further accentuate Japan’s 
vulnerability. However, Japan’s dilemma has not been resolved, at best it will be 
dormant for the time being.  Tokyo will remain divided between a desire to reach 
a normal power status and the necessity to ensure its security by relying on the US 
protection.
Moreover, Tokyo tensions with fellow US allies as South Korea are seen as dys‑
functional by Washington and a potential factor to erode Japan’s value for the US. 
The same could be said about Japan’s eventual refusal to join the TPP, a fundamen‑
tal instrument for the US to reassert its influence and soft power in Asia.
Japan is increasingly aware that the fundamental nature of the US‑China relation‑
ship at the global level is a constraining factor in the development of the US‑Japan 
relation. It is clear that there is a limit to the costs the US is prepared to bear to 
support Japan’s position. In addition, China will do its best to undermine the US‑
Japan alliance by testing its consistency and trying to deepen closer economic ties 
with Japan. 
The way in which the US‑Japan alliance will evolve is also dependent on the ca‑
pacity to coordinate two different agendas and objectives. One interesting pers‑
pective is to look at the balance between soft and hard power in the context of the 
alliance (Arase, 2013: 170) and the extent to which there is a mismatch between 
the US and Japan. For the US the agenda involves the moderation in the use of 
its hard power, in many respects abused and ineffective in the Bush era, and the 
investment in its soft power in Asia to counterbalance China’s strong influence 
in the region. For Japan the direction seems to be the opposite. Confronted with 
a decline in its soft power and a deficit in its relation with Beijing unlikely to be 
reversed in the near future, Tokyo is increasingly inclined to invest in its hard 
power as the only option left. Abe’s options seem to prove that. The problem is 
that a greater investment in hard power is likely to trigger a strong reaction in 
the region because of history, at the same time it might introduce further tension 
inside the alliance.
Conclusions
The security framework in East Asia is and will remain anchored in the US‑
China‑Japan triangular relation. However, the rise of China and its status as a 
prominent regional power has changed the balance of power inside the triangle 
and triggered a complex process of readjustment involving a new US approach 
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to the region as well as an increasingly intense and hot rivalry between Japan 
and China. 
So far Japan has not been successful in dealing with China’s rise and predomi‑
nance in Asia and is being forced to rethink its strategy. There are signs of a decline 
in Japan’s economic power as a result of a stagnated economy, large macroeco‑
nomic imbalances with a huge public deficit and the highest level of public debt in 
the world, the loss of leadership in many areas of technology and a rapidly ageing 
population that is risk‑aversion prone unwilling to consume, politically conserva‑
tive and resisting change in the political system.  In 2012 Japan registered for the 
first time in decades a considerable trade deficit which might constitute a turning 
point in its traditional image as a global trade power.
The dysfunctional nature of Japan’s political system marked by the absence of 
competition and resistance to change is a major factor to explain Japan’s difficulty 
in implementing structural reforms and flexibly adapting to the new challenges 
of globalization as well as to the evolution of Asia’s regional order. Moreover, the 
absence of domestic competition both in Japan’s economic and political system is 
a limiting factor in terms of Japan’s capability to cope with an increasing external 
competition, especially China’s pressure.
The recent preeminence of territorial disputes in East Asia in which Japan and 
above all China are actively involved is a symptom of structural changes in the 
power balance in Asia. The Senkaku islands dispute between China and Japan is 
a complex case that goes well beyond competition for the control of resources, oil 
and natural gas but also marine fish resources and the attempt to secure fishing 
rights, insofar it has a fundamental strategic dimension touching simultaneously 
on the two most sensitive security issues for China: the Taiwan question and the 
US‑Japan alliance strategic scope. It also illustrates the current state of affairs 
between China and Japan. Beijing’s muscular approach and trade retaliation in 
September clearly confirmed Japan’s deficit of soft power in its relation with Bei‑
jing as well as its vulnerability deriving from a growing economic interdepend‑
ence with China.
The new Abe government approach to the conflict and overall relation with China, 
highly influenced by a strong nationalist perspective, seems to reveal a preference 
for a militarization of Japan and the change in the numbers and nature of the SDF. 
The main argument of the paper is that Japan is trying to address the problem of 
its declining soft power, and major constraints to rebuild it in Asia, by rebuilding 
its hard power. In addition Tokyo is aiming at strengthening the US‑Japan alliance 
as the anchor of its own security, especially in a context where Japan looks weaker 
and more vulnerable. 
However, this compensation strategy is likely to be counterproductive in the sense 
that it might further erode Japan’s soft power because of the negative impact on 
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other Asian countries and the escalation of tension with China. It is a situation 
where the exercise of hard power might undercut soft power. Moreover, this might 
create tensions inside the US‑Japan alliance when the US is keener to invest in soft 
power and is increasingly constrained by the centrality of its relation with China 
increasingly global and no longer restricted to Asia.
Given the complementarity between soft and hard power and the necessity to 
combine them in the right proportions in order to be effective (Nye, 2008: 43), Ja‑
pan has to invest seriously in rebuilding its soft power which will require painful 
domestic economic and political reforms to restore its dynamism, greater open‑
ness to the world, a new strategy to deal with history and a balanced foreign and 
security policy. No doubt Japan has the qualified human resources, the technology 
and the will to succeed in this endeavor but for the moment still lacks leadership.
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